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ABSTRACT 
 
ARSENIY GUTNIK: MAKING SENSE OF POST-SOVIET NGO ACTIVISM: COMMITTED 
ACTIVISTS, TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTION-BUILDING AND NEOLIBERAL REFORMS 
IN UKRAINE  
(Under the direction of Howard Aldrich) 
 
 
Following Ukraine's independence, Westerners and local reformers transformed the system of 
social services. More weight was put on individual efforts and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) to meet citizens’ needs.  Critiques of NGOs highlight their self-serving orientation, which 
hinders service provision and social change.  However, using data from my pilot study of Ukrainian 
HIV/AIDS organizations, I show that: 1) Looking inside organizations reveals a contingent of highly 
committed activists.  2) Yet, even among activists with the best intentions, individualistic notions 
inherent in neoliberal reforms and Western civil society models influence their activities in complex 
ways that potentially sustain a less egalitarian system.  NGO critiques thus do not fully address the 
underlying assumptions and broader context of the NGO project. I also suggest that scholars should 
devote more attention to investigating supposed NGO advantages of limited corruption and less 
bureaucracy.  Finally, I briefly outline an extension of the findings to transnational activism.   
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PREFACE 
 
In the mid-1980’s I lived with my parents in Kiev, Ukraine, in a Soviet dormitory-style 
communal apartment with bleak beige walls, a shared bathroom in the hallway and a kitchen for 
several families.  One fond childhood memory was a very large, old, wooden chest, with a large metal 
lock, which stood outside the door of our flat and always captivated my imagination - what could be 
inside?  Living in that communal apartment was a unique experience embedded in the realities of 
Soviet life and ideology about individualism, privacy, and corresponding social provisions.   
In the late 1980’s, I moved to Russia with my family and in 1993 immigrated to Upstate New 
York.  On a return visit to Ukraine, in 2005, I visited my old apartment building and found it 
completely remodeled, with bulky, brown, wooden doors indicating newly separated apartments that 
replaced the old communal arrangement.  The large wooden chest was conspicuously missing from 
the stairwell, leaving me with unresolved wonder about its contents.  Much had changed.  
Privatization of the 1990’s challenged communal Soviet values and redefined much of civic life.  
Through the newly open borders, emigrants and curious tourists left the country, while a stream of 
foreign visitors, experts, scholars and organizations flowed into the post-Soviet space (Chernova 
2005, p. 14).   
During the summer of 2006, I was exploring my options for an internship and came into 
contact with a U.S.-based nonprofit that had a large USAID-funded “civil society” development 
project in Ukraine.  After speaking with the nonprofit representatives, I was referred to the Kiev 
office for further inquiries.  Coincidentally, the office was located on same street where I used to live 
years ago.  I was a bit apprehensive about contacting the personnel.  Despite the fact that I was fluent 
in Russian (many Ukrainians are as well), I was not familiar with Russian or Ukrainian NGO (non-
governmental organization) terminology.  In fact, I did not know what to expect, since I had not spent 
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more than a couple weeks at a time on recent family visits and had never heard of “civil society” 
projects or foreign-funded, locally-operated, non-governmental organizations, while living in Ukraine 
and Russia.  When I called the office, I was surprised to hear the woman on the other end of the line 
describe NGO activities in terms that I easily recognized from English.  The Ukrainian website 
similarly contained Ukrainian transliterations of English words, like advokasy (advocacy) and 
treningy (trainings).  The phenomenon was not unique to this organization.  In fact, Hrycak (2006), 
who had conducted research on foreign-funded NGOs in Ukraine, during the late 1990’s and early 
2000’s, concluded that American catch phrases, such as “coffee break,” “grass-roots,” and “fund-
raising,” were prevalent in “foundation programs and foreign assistance seminar schedules in 
Ukraine.  These American terms have migrated from foreign mission statements and grant 
announcements into the vocabulary of elite Ukrainian NGOs (p. 93).”  So what were these NGOs?  
How did the modes of cultural transmission that Hrycak described work in practice?  What did their 
existence mean in the local context?
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, I attempt to shed some light on the significance of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) in Ukraine, building on existing scholarship, as well as my own pilot research 
on Ukrainian HIV/AIDS organizations.  This study brings into conversation institutional, 
organizational, political and development discourses, to show how people faced with the complex 
new logics of the post-Soviet transition attempted to make sense of their daily work in recently 
created, Western-funded, non-governmental organizations.  Moreover, I suggest that HIV/AIDS NGO 
activists’ current understanding of their work - as an internal critique to personally do more to 
improve local conditions - has potential implications for sustaining a decentralized, individualistic, 
social safety net in Ukraine (and plausibly in other NGO environments).   
While I generally agree with other scholars’ conclusion that foreign aid has had unintended, 
sometimes even detrimental effects, I argue that these critiques could benefit from a more direct 
investigation of the assumptions underlying development aid, a description of the broader social 
reforms, and counterfactual alternatives to Western claims about NGOs. Moreover, scholars studying 
these organizations have largely focused on the organizational level of analysis, identifying important 
external relations between NGOs and other stakeholders, but generally only in passing examining 
internal relations and the meaning of work.  If we look at the individual level, however, we discover 
nuanced distinctions among workers, their motivation, as well as innovative, undocumented voluntary 
activities that extend beyond functional obligations.  Importantly, stratifying NGOs internally 
indicates that across organizations exists a contingent of highly committed workers who personally 
experienced or continue to experience many of their clients’ concerns and problems and thus 
genuinely strive to effect positive social change.  Despite often admirable efforts among committed 
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workers, the ideological models and social constraints of the broader social reforms and Western 
assistance programs create an uncertain environment, which leads them to rely on their own efforts 
and to adopt individualistic, decentralized approaches to resolving local social problems.       
  I begin by focusing on Ukrainian socio-economic transformations that followed the collapse 
of the Soviet Union.  In particular, I highlight the roles of Western governments and institutions, such 
as the Washington-based IMF and World Bank, elite private consultants, as well as local Ukrainian 
reformers.  These actors embraced a neoliberal skepticism about the centralized power of the state, 
prevalent in liberal-market regimes, and a positive view of personal choice within market 
competition.  I specify how this transformation affected the provision of social services and 
diminished the social safety net, instead putting more weight on individual efforts and the capacity of 
non-governmental organizations to meet citizens’ many personal needs and defend their civil, 
political, and socio-economic rights.   
I subsequently summarize some of the main problems permeating Western-funded NGOs, 
using the case of women’s, particularly feminist, post-Soviet organizations, which have received the 
bulk of scholarly attention over the past 15 years.  Critiques in the literature highlight that NGOs and 
their staff have remained largely disconnected from local constituencies, often engaging in self-
serving activities, rather than social change, which hinders NGOs’ reach and sustainability.  However, 
using data from my own pilot study of Ukrainian HIV/AIDS NGOs, I show that: 1) looking inside 
organizations reveals differences among workers and indicates a contingent of highly committed, 
innovative, activists with genuine desire for social change, and yet 2) even among the most 
committed activists, with perhaps the best intentions, individualistic notions inherent in neoliberal 
reforms and Western civil society models are influencing their activities in complex, sometimes 
subtle, but significant ways, thus potentially sustaining a less egalitarian system, but not necessarily 
in the ways usually described in the literature.   
I then propose that limited corruption and bureaucracy (efficiency), cited as reasons for 
funding NGOs, rather than providing assistance to democratizing states, may be less objective and 
  
   
 3 
more ideologically-grounded than previously assumed.  I indicate that we need further critical study 
of these important questions.  In conclusion, I investigate a potential extension of the findings to 
transnational activism, arguing that we should take into considerations not only NGOs’ advocacy, but 
also their service functions, which bring to focus a somewhat different set of relationships with 
constituencies and the state.
  
  
 
CHAPTER II  
UKRAINIAN NEOLIBERAL REFORMS: WESTERN AND LOCAL ACTORS  
 
Western Players 
 
Following Soviet collapse, Western governments, such as the U.S., and international 
institutions, like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union and 
others, were interested in Ukraine’s relatively large population (about 50 million people) and strategic 
position between Russia and Europe, for national security and other reasons (Pishchikova 2007).  
Following Ukraine’s independence in 1991, major Western players, poorly versed in local legal and 
other traditions, called for rapid and sweeping changes while sidelining gradual approaches, as they 
did in other former Soviet republics (Trofimenko 2003, p. 39, 147-148).  The country thus embarked 
on a transition to democratic politics and a market economy (Bandera 2003, Trofimenko 2003).   
Outside investment in Ukraine was considerable, but followed sponsors’ specific agendas.  
For instance, between 1992 and 2003, Ukraine received almost 3 billion dollars of U.S. assistance, 
much of it through USAID, which accounted for one quarter of all U.S. aid to the twelve former 
Soviet nations.  This money was used for economic restructuring, democratization and reforms in the 
health and social sectors, but not humanitarian aid and economic growth (Pishchikova 2007, p. 38).   
The structure of policy planning initiatives also reflected strong Western bias.  The foreword 
to the edited volume entitled Ukraine: Accelerating the Transition to Market, which contained the 
proceedings of a summer 1996 IMF/World Bank seminar, held in Washington, D.C., stated that by 
embracing Western-recommended reforms, Ukraine had achieved a degree of credibility in the eyes 
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of the international community.1  A look at the affiliations of the 80 seminar participants (about 68 
men and 12 women) revealed that 53 (66%) were either from the IMF or the World Bank.  
Meanwhile, eight attendees (10%) were from Ukraine, but none of them made any presentations.   
IMF/World Bank staff labeled some Ukrainian interests counterproductive.  During one 
session, Koch-Weser (1997), a World Bank representative, stated that lobbying from public workers 
(whose positions were being eliminated), coal miners2 (i.e. a large part of the energy sector), farming 
interests, and pressure from elements in the parliament, were slowing down reforms.  The rhetoric 
often had real implications.  In Russia, for instance, the IMF essentially blocked the passage of a 
popular budget of the Russian parliament, in August of 1993. The deficit established in the budget 
was greater than the IMF wanted and they threatened to pull a promised loan tranche.  “In other 
words, the IMF and its closest U.S. associates saw the actions of the Russian parliament as an 
obstacle to their priorities and policies that had to be circumvented (Reddaway and Glinski 2001, p. 
294).”  
 
Local Reformers 
 
Ukrainian reformers adopted major Western recommendations.  After Soviet collapse, state 
institutions were touted as corrupt, overly bureaucratic and inefficient; moreover, the economy was 
unstable after independence and throughout the 1990s.  Many local politicians and middle class 
professionals, leery of Soviet economic and social controls, considered the reform perspective as the 
necessary, legitimate, solution (Reddaway and Glinski 2001, Zhurzhenko 2001, p. 34).  Some of the 
                                                 
1
 The seminar was a series of presentations by IMF/World Bank staff, followed by a “general discussion.”  The 
focus was on IMF/WB policies and programs that would take effect in 1997 (Kavalsky and Odling Smee 1997, 
p. iii-iv). 
 
2
 Five hundred thousand Ukrainian miners, who “earned their living in the official public sector (Mykhnenko 
2003, p. 104),” working in one of the world’s most dangerous mining conditions, with an average life 
expectancy of 38 years, struck in 1989.  This was followed by much contestation over the following decade, 
including 1996 protests involving over 600,000 miners, who demanded $122 million in back wages, and 
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most prominent figures included President Kuchma (1994-2004), Victor Yushchenko, and Roman 
Shpek.3  Since taking office, President Kuchma pledged to undertake radical reforms to transition 
Ukraine to a market economy.  For instance, in the late 1990’s, the National Academy of Science, as 
well as government ministries, including Ministry of the Economy, sponsored a conference aimed at 
speeding up the market transition (Bandera 2003, p. 58).4  
 
Social Safety Net Reforms  
 
Social reforms that conformed to neoliberal logic began right after Ukrainian independence.  
Bandera (2003), for example, wrote that “quite significantly, the government [now] pursues the 
attainment of public objectives like social security and equity in the context of the market system 
rather than through the plan-command process (p. 70).”  A 1994 World Bank study, “which turned 
almost into a bible for all those who favour a radical pension reform (Adam 1999, p. 133),” advocated 
reduction of state-run pensions.  The World Bank was critical of monopolistic government 
management and investment of funds, and emphasized a fully funded, privately run management 
system, along with a personal or occupational component (Adam 1999, p. 133-134).  In 1998, the 
Parliament passed insurance plans for pensions, unemployment, temporary loss of ability to work, 
childbirth, funeral-related obligations, and occupational disease (Yatsenko 2005).     
                                                                                                                                                       
another 140,000 miners picketing regional governments and blocking roads and railroad tracks (Mykhnenko 
2003).    
 
3
 Victor Yushchenko: current President of Ukraine, former Prime Minister and National Bank Chairman. 
Roman Shpek: current Permanent Representative to the European Union, former chairman of the National 
Agency of Ukraine for Reconstruction and Development, Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, 1995-6, 
and Minister of Economy 1993-5 (Aslund and deMenil 2000, Wikipedia 2007).   
 
4
 Despite a large degree of agreement with Western counterparts, or acquiescence to their demands, some local 
reformers indicated their dependent position and desire for greater Western development of certain local 
institutions.  For example, Shpek (2000, p. 46) highlighted that Ukraine relied substantially on IMF and World 
Bank loans, but should instead have access to EU and U.S. trade markets.  He also stated that Western nations 
should provide educational opportunities to young Ukrainians abroad and also invest in the domestic Ukrainian 
educational system (particularly economics education), to prevent brain-drain of academics (p. 45-6).   
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Ukrainian reforms were similar to those in Russia, where massive efforts on the part of the 
Yeltsin administration to decrease the budget deficit, with continued pressure from the IMF, resulted 
in “the government’s [default] on domestic obligations, including those due to pensioners and to the 
work force in the public sector (Reddaway and Glinski 2001, p. 250).”  Meanwhile, President 
Kuchma, “in response to [international monetary agency loan contract] pressures, in July 
1998…ordered the halving of government contributions to the state-run Chernobyl Fund.  Soon after, 
the government issued a press release stating the Ukraine’s budget deficit had dropped from 3.3 to 2.5 
percent of [GDP] (Petryna 2002, p. 114).” 5  
People like World Bank representative Koch-Weser (1997), advocated targeted social 
protections to only help the “truly needy,” while reducing others’ benefits.  Koch-Weser argued that 
while it may have been best for the government to allow “inflation to erode pension and other benefits 
across the board and to compress the benefit structure (Koch-Weser (1997, p. 7),” to undergo price 
liberalization during the first five years of reforms, the option of further benefit compression had been 
exhausted.  It was not clear, however, from his comments about the new targeted benefits, who and 
under what conditions constituted the truly needy, which is one of the problems with this approach.    
 
Neoliberalism: Decentralizing the State, Promoting the Market 
 
Local reformers and their Western counterparts promoted another aspect of the neoliberal 
agenda, notably working to decrease the size and centralization of the state and increase market 
competition (Pishchikova 2007).  This perspective reflected skepticism about the state, particularly 
prevalent in the U.S. (Edwards 2004, p. 7-8), although the EU also promoted a policy that reinforced 
free trade, the private sector and state retrenchment (Hurt 2006, p. 119).  Scholars critical of state 
                                                 
5
 On the other hand, Goralska (2000, p. 248) stated that the president had abolished the 12% Chernobyl tax in 
1998. 
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retrenchment, however, have called for further investigation of the role state institutions should play 
in society.  Kuzio (2003, following Przeworski), for example, wrote that neoliberal views  
 
underestimate the role of state institutions in organizing both the public and private 
life of groups and individuals.  If democracy is to be sustained, the state must 
guarantee territorial integrity and physical security, it must maintain the conditions 
necessary for an effective exercise of citizenship, it must mobilize public savings, co-
ordinate resource allocation, and correct income distribution.  And if state institutions 
are to be capable of performing these tasks, they must be reorganized, rather than 
simply reduced (p. 25). 
 
 
Reforms, however, proceeded under assumptions that the state was inefficient, corrupt and overly 
bureaucratic and therefore should relinquish significant control, in favor of non-state institutions 
(Bandera 2003, p. 71, Reimann 2005, p. 38).  Furthermore, according to this view, the state 
potentially hindered enterprise development and bred a kind of “culture of dependency;” although 
some scholars have contested these claims (Walsh et. al. 1997, p. 1, 6).6  In Ukraine, state reduction 
views impacted the government.  Bandera (2003) noted that “compared with the preceding Soviet 
centralized command system, by now, the scope of the [Ukrainian] government has been reduced 
considerably so that it does not overwhelm the market mechanism (p. 70).”   
 
Decentralizing Social Services, the Contracting Shift and the Role of NGOs 
 
State and social reforms meant new institutional arrangements for dealing with service 
delivery as well as other social needs. Services provided through the state were now the responsibility 
of local authorities and therefore Ukraine was transferring state social assets to local municipalities 
(Shpek 2000, p. 43) and private service providers.  In the West, such reforms occurred earlier.  Walsh 
et. al. (1997, p. 5, following Flynn 1990), for example, described the logic of the 1980’s 
                                                 
6
 Other negative properties assigned to the state, for example in the UK during the Thatcher reforms, also 
included managerial self-interest, inability to meet objectives, ineffective cost control, waste, and producers’ 
interests distorting service delivery (Walsh et. al. 1997).   
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transformation of the public sector in the UK.  These reforms were based on several neoliberal 
arguments:  First, market mechanisms should be applied universally.  Second, competition should 
exist among service providers and should be sharpened by allowing consumers to decline state 
services.  Third, individual choice should trump collective interest.  Fourth, state provisions should be 
minimized.  The arguments were based on the presumption of post-WWII failure of the Keynesian 
welfare state to deliver economic and social stability, and were particularly prevalent in Anglo-Saxon 
countries.   
Despite a focus on the UK, Walsh et. al. (1997, p. 182), stated that the trend of service 
contracting, linked to changes in the public sector and adoption of market-based organizational 
approaches, was global in scope and in some cases resulted in regulatory and normative pressures to 
conform.  Underscoring the relevance of neoliberal Western institutions, the authors argued that “[a]n 
example of [ideological] imposition in the international context includes the relationship between 
developing countries and the World Bank (Walsh et. al. 1997, p. 182).”  Westerners, furthermore, 
advocated an important role for non-governmental organizations (NGOs), promoted within the 
context of citizen capacity for self-determination and democratization.  Reimann (2005, p. 38) noted 
that neoliberal advocates saw NGOs as a better, market-based alternative to corrupt, failing states in 
developing and democratizing nations, which would bring about grassroots mobilization and civil 
society.7   
Hanlon (2000, p. 136), moreover, argued that donors preferred to fund NGOs and technical 
assistance contractors because they did not need to negotiate detailed programs with NGOs, as they 
did with governments.  Pishchikova (2007, p. 40, following Carothers and Ottaway 2000), 
meanwhile, proposed that the attractiveness of civil society assistance in the form of support for small 
                                                 
7
 Richter (2002) defined civil society as “an overlapping network of autonomous voluntary associations – 
formal and informal, political and nonpolitical – that creates a space for public action between the individual 
and the state (p. 55).”   
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civic groups was its low cost, compared, for instance, to broad industry or banking restructuring, or 
engineering projects.   
The role of Western sponsorship and NGO initiatives in post-Soviet Ukraine is readily 
apparent today.  In December 2006, on World AIDS Day, President Yushchenko issued a statement8 
relegating responsibility for curbing the Ukrainian HIV/AIDS crisis (one of the largest in Europe) to 
collaborative efforts of the government, international donors, NGOs and individuals. He did not 
specify how much of a role each of the named parties would or should play, but it was clear that the 
Ukrainian state was only partly responsible for crisis resolution.9 Moreover, he tied individualistic, 
decentralized solutions to “vital…reforms.”   
Throughout the rest of the paper, I focus on NGOs’ prominent new role in Ukraine, drawing 
first on available scholarship and then on my own pilot case study of Ukrainian HIV/AIDS 
organizations.  The NGO project has not been without its critics, who have cited numerous ways in 
which these organizations do not live up to promised social change.  In the next section, I provide 
                                                 
8
   “To appreciate the consequences of the epidemic, it is vital to institute medical, social and educational 
reforms, and to build cooperation between the government and the people, international organizations and 
NGOs, which should join their efforts to combat the epidemic.  
    The responsibility of all individuals for their behavior and [their] relatives becomes particularly important. 
    We must launch a massive educational campaign to forewarn teenagers of the dangers of trying drugs. The 
easiest and the cheapest way to minimize the risk of getting HIV is to adhere to the everlasting values of family 
fidelity and respect.  
    I urge each citizen, ministers, NGOs, business people, medical workers, educators and religious leaders to 
make a consistent and daily contribution to the cause of fighting the epidemic of HIV/AIDS in Ukraine. We 
must be tolerant, support the people affected by this evil and never create obstacles in their way. 
    I would like to give my support to the HIV-positive people: the creation of the National Network of People 
Living with HIV is an example of courage and hope. Your firm determination to fight the disease and your 
active cooperation with state institutions and NGOs become a powerful factor in combating the epidemic and 
help save each individual living with HIV.” 
 Source: http://ww8.president.gov.ua/en/news/data/11_12351.html  Accessed Nov. 2007 
 
9
 In May 2006, the BBC reported that $30 million came from the government, over $90 million from the Global 
Fund for HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis (a Geneva-based NGO), and a $60 million loan from the World Bank 
(which was suspended temporarily due to allegations of government fund mismanagement).   
 Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/news/story/2006/05/060503_aids_ukraine_it.shtml  Accessed Nov. 
2007.   
UNAIDS, however, stated that in 2007, the government raised its domestic funding to $20 million, while a new 
Global Fund grant was approved for up to US$ 151 million and in “late 2006, the World Bank lifted its 
suspension of its loan for HIV and tuberculosis, providing an additional US$ 24 million for national AIDS 
activities.”  
 Source: http://www.unaids.org/en/Regions_Countries/Countries/ukraine.asp Accessed Nov. 2007.   
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more detailed information about these criticisms.  In the subsequent section, I point out that a more 
nuanced look at variation within NGOs reveals that the prevalent critiques may not apply evenly 
across NGOs and their staff.  Neoliberal reforms, nonetheless, may still be having an impact, but one 
sparsely discussed in the literature.
   
 
 
CHAPTER III 
POST-SOVIET NGOs AND THEIR CRITICS  
 
Here I summarize recent NGO literature and critiques, drawing primarily on examples from 
post-Soviet women’s organizations, because they have received the bulk of scholarly attention over 
the past 15 years and because the critiques have overlapped considerably across post-Soviet states.  
Some analogous ideological, organizational and institutional issues have also been documented across 
a variety of organizations, for example among environmental NGOs in Russia (Powell 2002).    
NGOs act as intermediaries between the global (Western) civil society development 
community and local audiences to promote “social, economic, and political change in developing 
countries (Brown and Kalegaonkar 2002, p. 233).”  Salamon and Anheier (1997) argued that a 
common definition is necessary to talk about organizations that have a variety of labels in each 
nation, across the world and among authors. For instance, “nongovernmental,” “nonprofit” 
“philanthropic,” and “civil society organizations” just to name a few.  I adopt three of Salamon and 
Anheier’s (1997) criteria essentially verbatim and a modified fourth criterion, which apply to all 
organizations henceforth, regardless of the label, unless specified otherwise.  First, the group must be 
organized and have some structural permanence, such as regular meetings, rules and officers; it 
should not be purely ad hoc and informal.  Second, the organization should be private, or not under 
the majority control of government officials or government apparatus.  Third, organizations should 
not be profit-distributing, meaning that all profits go into sustaining the organizations’ activities and 
the necessary personnel.  Fourth, the organizations should be self-governing, having internal 
procedures that may be substantially influenced, but are not entirely controlled by outside entities 
(Salamon and Anheier 1997, p. 33-34).  Post-Soviet NGOs thus fit Aldrich and Ruef’s (2006) 
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description of a newly emergent population: a collection of distinct new organizational forms “that 
are alike in some key respects (p. 178).”      
Western donors sponsoring women’s organizations sought independent groups to develop 
civil society (Hemment 2004, p. 219).  The funding, consequently, was not distributed equally.  
Richter (2002) argued that “feminist organizations receive a disproportionate share of Western 
assistance among women’s organizations, and they are more dependent than other women’s 
organizations on such assistance for their survival (p. 54).”10  He added that Russian feminists were 
also more likely to look to the West for sponsorship.  Hrycak (2006) argued that “[m]any local 
observers claim that these former ‘nationalists’ were not ‘real feminists,’ but rather that they were 
attracted by the lure of foreign grants and foreign salaries. While most local organizations have no 
funding, elite NGOs…attract considerable grants and pay their staff sizeable incomes (88).”  In 
Bulgaria, in 2000, for example, international organizations paid their highly skilled workers $900 per 
month, when the average monthly salary was $200 (Ghodsee 2004).   
Kotovskaya (2004) pointed out that the most active participants of the feminist movement 
were rather elite “representatives of the scientific and artistic intelligentsia; for many of them 
participation in the movement became an important aspect of self-realization…they all came from 
educated [‘developed’] families, personally engaged in scientific or artistic activities and were on 
average 43-55 years old (p. 170, 171).”  Chernova (2005, p. 14-15)11 cited among Russian academics 
(and other researchers) interested in gender studies, a sort of “academic hunger” stemming from a 
paucity of academic publications based on Russian research, and a lack of professional contacts with 
Western colleagues, as primary reasons for seeking such connections in the early-mid 1990’s.  Most 
had acquired training on gender issues abroad from Western foundations and non-profits (Hrycak 
                                                 
10
 While little data exists on the numbers and kinds of women’s organizations in former Soviet states, some 
scholarly estimates from the late 1990’s indicate that approximately two to four thousand women’s 
organizations were active in Russia (Richter 2002, p. 54).  Feminist organizations made up a minority of these 
groups.    
 
11
 Chernova’s (2005) work was published in a Russian-language volume financed by the Ford Foundation. 
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2006, p. 84).  Ghodsee (2004), moreover, quoted an UNDP National Development Report which 
concluded that “the NGO sector [in Bulgaria] is growing not only because of the availability of a 
solvent and low-risk market represented by donors, but also because of the growing unemployment 
among intellectuals (p. 739, emphasis original).” 
Feminist activists had difficulty finding local connections, due to ideological rifts. 12  They 
were critical of local women and “traditional” women’s organizations that adhered to maternalistic 
principles, were reluctant to politicize relations between men and women and thus potentially threaten 
the sanctity of the household.  Local women, on the other hand, said that they did not perceive 
discrimination, or felt that Soviet-era “equality” had not benefited them and were reluctant to join 
groups advocating for women’s rights.  NGO feminists saw these arguments as denying women a 
“choice” (Hrycak 2006, p. 74-5, 85, Richter 2002, p. 61).  Gisela Bock’s (1989) comment aptly 
summarizes the problems that funded NGOs encountered in promoting their Western feminist 
visions: “[t]he difference between women’s and men’s history does not imply that the history of 
women is identical for all women. … Awareness of the otherness, the difference, the inequality 
between female and male history has [to be] complemented by an awareness and historical study of 
the otherness, the differences and inequalities among women themselves (Bock 1989, p. 8).”  Ghodsee 
(2004) argued that we could consider Western approaches to foster women’s activism a kind of 
“feminism-by-design.”  This logic paralleled the flood of Western consultants and foundations 
promoting the “capitalism-by-design” paradigm that subverted the contextual idiosyncrasies of the 
post-Soviet space.  NGOs were seen as disconnected from and unaccountable to local audiences.   
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 I employ the term “Western feminism” synonymously with a kind of “NGO feminism,” which generally 
encompassed three aspects in the literature: (importantly) the use of the word “feminism” (along with other 
English words, like gender), a focus on women’s individual rights and capacity, and a focus on women’s 
substandard social position with respect to men.   
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NGO Accountability 
 
Accountability, according to Ebrahim (2005, p. 59-60), involves reciprocal commitments in a 
relationship between two or more actors, although the more powerful actor can make claims on the 
actions of the dependent actor.   Scholars have argued that funded NGOs did not have strong 
incentives to remain accountable to local constituencies, because donors served as the main source of 
support.  Donors’ quantitative accountability standards, moreover, worked against accountability to 
local constituencies, because they did not evaluate the qualitative impacts of the projects.  Ebrahim 
(2005, p. 64, 71) noted that accountability standards established by donors often demand short-term, 
technical, results, such as the number of people served, pamphlets distributed, and so on, which could 
distort important qualities, such as the actual impacts of these actions.  Stirrat (2000) argued that 
accountability standards are highly rationalistic and quantitative because “to count is to know – and to 
control (p. 36),” in modern neoliberal parlance.  Scholars, like Henderson (2003), have also 
confirmed that donors working in Russia must meet stringent demands and time-consuming 
accountability standards of home offices, while attempting to have real impact on the ground, 
although “evaluations often focus on whether the grantee met the requirements of the project, not on 
the impact of the work funded (p. 88).”   
 
Professionalism and Top-Down NGO Management 
 
Scholars have also discussed how NGOs distribute tasks among staff and carry out projects, 
in particular highlighting the role of top-down management and professionalism.  Western influence 
was apparent here as well.  U.S. donors encouraged bureaucratic professionalism, or structured rule-
following, among Ukrainian women’s NGOs (Hrycak 2006, p. 72). Similarly, in the 1990’s donors 
began to professionalize and institute management practices among Russian environmental 
organizations (and elsewhere) (Powell 2002, p. 143).  Donor funding guidelines assigned directors 
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and upper management in post-Soviet NGOs with the task of implementing donor-specified projects, 
rather than making their own reflections and assessments (Hemment 2004, p. 238, Henderson 2003).  
Elsewhere, Mebrahtu (2003, p. 353) noted that the British organization ActionAid, active in Ethiopia, 
which sought to empower local field staff and people, generally failed to do so; instead, local staff 
had to adhere to donor guidelines.  The more flexible, bottom-up approach, which allowed for local 
input and members’ ideas, was generally rare (Lewis 2007, p. 32, 198).  
Thus far, NGOs appear largely ineffective at accomplishing their objectives.  Scholars have 
generally theorized NGO effectiveness as engaging local stakeholders and building up grassroots 
support for the promised civil society.  Instead, what they found fell short of these expectations.  
Internally, top-down management restricted organizational capacity for local input and reflection, 
instead emphasizing donor goals.  Externally, ideological differences, professional background, lack 
of accountability, and a restrictive funding structure, led to the formation of boundaries between 
NGOs and local stakeholders.
     
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
UNPACKING NGOs: VOLUNTEERING AND COMMITTED STAFF. A PARTIAL REJOINDER 
TO THE CRITICS 
 
 
In a partial rejoinder to scholars’ critiques, I attempt to show that some NGO activists 
creatively pushed against their structural constraints to produce some local impact.  Staff members’ 
meaning of and motivation for work varied within organizations.  Significantly, NGOs employed a 
cadre of highly committed activists who closely identified with their constituencies and actively 
worked to make their work locally relevant, even engaging in unpaid voluntary labor.  These 
activists’ efforts, furthermore, engaged people across top-down internal hierarchies and thus 
potentially expanded a view of what NGOs “do.”  This more nuanced perspective suggests that a 
contingent of activists, and possibly NGOs, defies some of the prevalent criticisms.  As I show later, 
however, even among the most committed workers notions of individualism and support for a 
decentralized safety net arose subtly as the outcome of a complex meaning-making process embedded 
in broader neoliberal social reforms and relationships with Western donors.  In order to illustrate 
these dynamics, I draw on the literature and employ my interviews with a small sample of HIV/AIDS 
NGO staff members.  But first, I describe my research, Ukrainian NGO demographics and the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic.   
 
HIV/AIDS NGOs: Sample and Methods 
 
I carried out a pilot study with a small sample of staff members from Western-funded 
Ukrainian NGOs working on HIV/AIDS issues, who attended an extended training session and 
“experience exchange” in the United States, in 2007, sponsored by one of their donors.  I contacted 
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the U.S. organization that was hosting the Ukrainian staff and was allowed to observe workshops 
during the last several days of their stay.  I participated in two workshops during which I took notes 
on the presentations and handed out a closed-ended survey to the staff.  I subsequently conducted 
semi-structured, in-depth, interviews with three staff members, in their hotel.  Two additional 
interviews occurred over the phone, after the visitors had returned to Ukraine.  The survey mostly 
overlapped thematically with the interviews, but provided a brief summary of some responses, as well 
as numerical, demographic, data that I did not solicit in the interviews (see Appendix). 
I surveyed and interviewed the following people: Evgenia, 21, administrator of educational 
programs in a church-based NGO; Efim, late 20’s-early 30’s, program coordinator; Isaac, 29, NGO 
director/head; and Grigory, 32, social worker.  I only surveyed Irina, 27, head of a planning council of 
NGOs, though we had a brief conversation after one of the workshops. I only interviewed Vera, 30’s 
– early 40’s, program coordinator.  I utilized some information from statements made during 
workshops by Vera, Irina, as well as Arkady (approximately late 20s, assistant to an NGO 
coordinating council chairperson).  Additional information about the staff is in the Appendix.  All 
names have been changed.   
I also used information from follow-up emails with some of the delegation members I met 
and from personal statements of several regional NGO representatives listed on the website of the 
All-Ukrainian Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS (PLWH).13  Additionally, I analyzed a 
transcript of a round-table discussion between Ukrainian scholars and assorted local NGO staff, about 
HIV/AIDS representations in the mass media, which took place in February 2005, at the Ukrainian 
Media Reform Center.14   
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Source: http://www.network.org.ua/eng/regions_e.html  Accessed April 11, 2007.   
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NGO Demographics in Ukraine 
 
 In 2005, there were about 28,000 registered CSOs in Ukraine, but only about 4-5 thousand 
were active15 (Palyvoda and Kikot 2006).  In a recent study of active civil society organizations 
(CSOs; N=583) across Ukraine, Palyvoda and Kikot (2006) found that “[fourty-five percent of all] 
respondents…represented new organizations that registered after 1999; 30% of organizations were 
registered from 1996 to 1999; 13% of CSOs started their activities between 1992 and 1995, and 4% 
were registered before 1991 (Palyvoda and Kikot 2006, p. 22).”  Thus, most organizations were quite 
new.  Five percent of all organizations had 71-100 members, 7 % had 51-70 members, 16% had 1-10 
members, 20% had 31-50 members, 25% had over 100 members and 27% had 11-30 members.  In 
2005, 55% of all CSOs indicated that they received funding from international grants.  On average, 
these grants constituted 38% of the budget for organizations that received them.16  Participation in 
HIV/AIDS organizations was found to be equal among men and women.         
 
HIV/AIDS in Ukraine  
 
Ukraine is considered to have one of the worst HIV/AIDS epidemics in Europe.  “As of the 
end of 2005…377,600 [adult] people were estimated to be…living with HIV-infection in Ukraine, or 
1.4% adult prevalence (UNAIDS 2006).”  HIV/AIDS prevalence varies along gender lines and over 
time, largely because injecting drug users (IDUs, the most risk-prone group) are generally young 
men, although transmission patterns have shifted recently.  USAID (2003) (using 2002 data from the 
                                                                                                                                                       
14
 Source: http://mediareform.com.ua/old/article.php?articleID=383  Accessed in April 2007.   
 
15The CSO must have been be legally registered. The CSO must have had at least 2 years of experience 
implementing activities. The CSO must have implemented at least two programs or projects 
The CSO must have successfully completed several projects and been known in the region. 
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Ukrainian AIDS Center) indicated that in 1997, 87% of registered HIV cases in Ukraine were among 
IDUs, 11% were from heterosexual transmission, 2% from perinatal and 3% unknown sources.  By 
2001, the mode of transmission shifted to 57% among IDUs, 27% via heterosexual transmission, 13% 
perinatal and 3% unknown.  In 2001, 62% of HIV cases in Ukraine were among men and 38% among 
women, while AIDS cases were 76% among men and 24% among women.  In 2005, the estimated 
HIV infection averages among adults (15-49), were 205,660 for males (54.1%), 171,940 for females 
(45.2%), and 2,850 for children 14 and under (0.75%).  The three highest-risk groups included 
injecting drug users, with an estimated range of 11 - 66% HIV prevalence, followed by their partners 
with 8-31% HIV prevalence, and female sex workers with 8-31% prevalence (UNAIDS 2006).    
 
Discrimination, Rights Abuses, and Public Portrayals  
 
 The grim numbers do not clearly show the human side of the epidemic.  Infected people also 
experience discrimination, rights abuses and stigmatization.  The Media Reform Center discussion 
indicated that media portrayals were overwhelmingly negative.  They focused on medical statistics 
rather than preventative information, available services and positive experiences of people who take 
anti-retroviral drugs and continue to lead fulfilling lives.  The Center discussants, as well as my 
seminar notes and interviews indicated that for years, particularly in the 1990’s, but into the 2000s, 
HIV/AIDS was billed as a death sentence.  One NGO worker mentioned that it was also necessary to 
dispel myths about HIV/AIDS transmission.   
Instances when HIV+ individuals were identified in media reports (sometimes by one’s 
clothes, a golden tooth, a ring, etc.), as one lawyer explained, bore consequences such as dismissal 
from work or school, or refusal to give children vaccine shots.  In other cases, some pregnant HIV+ 
women were segregated in separate facilities, or denied some medical services.  Employers 
                                                                                                                                                       
16
 In my survey, however, 4 out of 5 respondents stated that 75-100% of the NGO budget comes from foreign 
donors, while one respondent indicated 51-75%, which shows that either HIV/AIDS organizations tend to 
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sometimes illegally demanded one’s medical history.  The lawyer described one of his cases when a 
woman, who was HIV+, along with her infant, was prepared to change jobs rather than disclose her 
positive status.  Disclosure in medical or other facilities sometimes occurred, particularly in small 
communities.  Drug users, moreover, faced potential prosecution, while men who have sex with men 
faced discrimination.  Vera and Grigory also indicated that HIV/AIDS self-help groups had to 
maintain strict confidentiality and secrecy, because there was danger from groups like skinheads. 
 
HIV/AIDS NGOs: Project-Based Services 
 
Infected people thus need psychological, socio-medical services and protection, and 
numerous organizations have moved into combat with the HIV/AIDS epidemic and related social 
issues.  Grigory, Issac, Efim and Vera indicated that in addition to informational and educational 
outreach efforts, their NGOs engaged in direct service provision. Services covered a wide range, from 
psychological assistance, to childcare, home aide services, restoring and filling out legal documents 
and paperwork, legal defense, supplying food packages, providing crucial anti-retroviral therapy 
(ART), and personal interventions.  Evgenia’s organization, which is a church-based foundation that 
assists other organizations in securing grants, also led preventative informational workshops 
(primarily for church members).   
 
HIV/AIDS NGO Staff: Unaccountable, Self-Serving Elites and Intellectuals? 
 
Providing services is a demanding and often difficult task.  Despite the strain, I suggest in this 
section that a number of shared characteristics and other circumstances lead to significant 
commitment among some HIV/AIDS NGO staff to their clients.  Staff members are, on average, 
similar to their clients in age and gender, and, more importantly, share, or have shared, many of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
receive more foreign funding, or that this was specific to my sample (see Appendix, Q. 23).    
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same experiences.  Additionally, they have generally joined and remained in their organizations for 
more “altruistic” reasons than academic curiosity, self-interest, or economic gain, as critics have 
argued.  Staff members in lower positions, in fact, are not highly paid and may endure considerable 
hardships.   
The nature of HIV/AIDS NGO services, moreover, necessitates direct contact between NGO 
staff and clients, sometimes including difficult interventions.  This contact opens up a space for moral 
accountability, which is generally associated with the “little people – those in subordinate positions.  
It concerns the informal means by which leaders are forced to be responsive to their followers or 
patrons to their clients (Hilhorst 2003, p. 127).”  Hilhorst (2003, p. 138) cited an example of moral 
accountability in action when Philippine locals, instead of accessing a nearby office or sending mail 
requests, traveled to the central office of an NGO (an “arduous trip”) to demand the release of 
additional funds for an ongoing project in which they were implicated.  “The social pressure they thus 
put on [the office worker] to respond to their needs was so strong that [she] felt she had no choice but 
to give the money, even though this was against the coordination agreement she had with [her partner 
organization].  As she said: ‘What could I do, they were just standing in the office with their shopping 
list.’ (Hilhorst 2003, p. 138).”   
Just like the Philippine locals’ presence had a direct effect on the NGO worker, I found 
numerous situations that likely exhibited a high degree of moral sway over HIV/AIDS staff.   Efim 
and Vera, for instance, mentioned cases when they personally made home visits to convince drug 
using parents and religious families to allow necessary medical attention for their HIV+ infants and 
children.  Other services, like counseling sessions, distribution of food and medicine also provided 
opportunities for direct engagement with clients.  Isaac, meanwhile, stated the following, as one of the 
reasons of why he liked his work: “I interacted with clients, I provided them with tangible help, I saw 
how [my assistance] helped people.”  Similarly, Grigory described a poignant case, when he and his 
colleagues saved a client’s life: 
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Grigory: Well…just recently…a young man basically was…could not even walk. 
[The man’s mother contacted the NGO.]  Basically, in very bad condition.  His only 
relatives were his mother, a pensioner, and…his children.  The children were school 
age.  Three children.  And he was alone…basically…He was the sole provider…And 
he was bed-ridden…He had meningitis, tuberculosis-induced meningitis; he would 
not recognize his mother, or anyone else.  And we put him back up on his feet.  I 
mean, due to…Well, let’s say, my own efforts.  I personally traveled…to see 
him…Called the ambulance.  Well, the ambulance…The mother had called the 
ambulance before, but no one wanted to take him in…We…I…persisted until they 
took him into the hospital.  Quickly found medication there, quickly examined him, 
did everything [necessary].  And did all this just in time, because later the doctor told 
us ‘guys, thank you so much!’  The doctor herself!  Even the doctor…not just his 
mother, who…The mother later came…almost in a stupor [and said]: ‘Boys, girls, 17 I 
will be grateful…all my life…that you put my son back up on his feet.’  And then we 
assigned him [anti-retroviral] therapy…Everything is in order, everything is good 
[now].   
 
 
Thus, although Hilhorst (2003) and I focused on situations that occurred in very different cultural 
contexts and the clients had different objectives, I argue that the moral imperative to remain 
responsive to clients in light of such direct interactions, involving some staff members, is hard to 
deny.   
 
Client and Staff Similarities 
 
Furthermore, it is important to highlight similarities between some staff members and their 
clients, which tie in with moral accountability and also contribute to worker commitment.  On 
average, HIV/AIDS clients and staff were close in age and gender.  Both were generally in their 20s 
and 30s (Appendix, Q. 9 and 10) 18 and (in my sample) women made up a slight majority (Appendix, 
Q. 8 and 11).  More importantly, NGO workers had personally experienced, or continued to 
experience, many of the hardships that their clients faced, and were thus motivated to help them.  
                                                 
17
 Terms of endearment sometimes used by older people when talking to those who are younger. 
   
18
 In Russia, which also has very high HIV infection rates, 1.1%18 (by the end of 2005), injecting drug users 
studied in Moscow hospitals (N=298) and on the street (N=126), in the late 1990’s, were, respectively, on 
average 20, 21 years old, 70, 77% male and studying or working (56%, 58%) (Reilley et. al. 2004, p. 224-225).   
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Hemment (2007) observed a similar trend in her research on a Tver’ women’s crisis center in mid-late 
1990’s Russia.  Before founding the center, Oktiabrina, the director, had to relocate with her family 
closer to her in-laws for support, after she and her husband had worked unpaid for six months at an 
institute in Siberia.  They had sold their two-room apartment and deposited the money in a local bank 
before moving to Tver’.  The bank suddenly collapsed a few weeks later and they lost all their 
savings.  Oktiabrina struggled to find work and endured substantial economic hardship, living with 
her husband and daughter in a “shabby one-room apartment that they rented on the edge of town 
(Hemment 2007, p. 105).”  Her experiences guided her ambitions to engage in practical projects to 
help local women, like herself (Hemment 2007, p. 104-105).   
Personal experiences and struggle were also motivating factors among HIV/AIDS NGO staff.  
Vera, who is openly HIV+, clearly underscored these issues when explaining why she and other 
colleagues had organized a self-help group in the late 1990’s (which they later turned into an NGO):  
 
Vera: We..I worked in an organization, responding to confidential calls about 
HIV/AIDS prevention and…illnesses transmitted through sexual contact and drug 
use.  And when…people called, I had a lot of difficulty…consulting these people.  I 
mean, when they indicated that they were HIV+, because I am HIV+ myself.  And 
we decided to create a self-help group.  We placed advertisements…People began 
calling our confidential line…This was 1999.  And from this self-help 
group…Basically, when we had helped ourselves…emotionally…we felt that it was 
necessary to help other people like ourselves.  We started organizing trips to the 
hospital facility of the regional AIDS center, where the bed-ridden patients were 
located; I mean, very sick people.  We helped them.  I mean, there was a 
certain…sort of this [informational] campaign, if you remember, there were posters 
[that stated]: ‘AIDS – Plague of the 20th Century’ and ‘You will die alone on a 
hospital pillow’ and so on and so forth.  In essence, an HIV+ diagnosis was equal to a 
death sentence.  And a quickly approaching one.  In reality, people did not see a 
possibility to lead a normal life with a positive status – to live, raise children, work, 
study.  So, in reality, the most important thing…initially, the idea is…to revitalize in 
people the belief that they can live fully.     
 
 
Vera’s account highlights issues echoed in other interviews.  Several NGOs began as self-help 
groups, but then expanded their activity.  Isaac’s brother, who is HIV+, had founded a self-help 
group, along with three HIV+ women, which later became the NGO that Isaac now directs.  Grigory’s 
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NGO grew out of a self-help group as well (though he joined later, when it was already registered), as 
did Efim’s NGO, which split off from Isaac’s organization several years ago.   
Much like Vera, Grigory, who, along with his wife, is HIV+, stated that he found it very 
important to share with clients his story, his initial experience as a client, and to explain that an HIV+ 
status was not a death sentence.  Both Grigory and Vera, moreover, had been hospitalized for 
tuberculosis, often associated with HIV infection, and consequently had first-hand experience with 
this illnesses and its treatment.  Other staff members also drew on their own experiences when 
assisting clients.  Efim, for example, mentioned that counselors in his organization, who help 
injecting drug users take replacement medication in order to quit, were themselves former drug users.  
Moving beyond my interviews, a look at the regional representatives of the Ukrainian People Living 
with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) Network, revealed that many workers were HIV+.19  Often, engagement 
with the Network was deeply personal.  As one regional branch director stated in his online profile: 
“…I live to work and work to live…”  
I also found evidence contrary to criticisms that NGO staff was elites working for personal 
gain and fulfillment of intellectual curiosity, despite the fact that the majority of respondents had 
higher education (although with some exceptions) (See Appendix, Q. 4,5,6).  Interviewees mentioned 
several reasons for initially engaging in HIV/AIDS work, but primary among these were the 
following: they joined as voluntary participants or clients, out of personal necessity for psychological 
and medical support (Vera, Grigory), on a voluntary basis because friends and/or family who were in 
self-help groups asked for help (Efim and Isaac helped with computer applications), on a voluntary 
basis because of affinity for people in the group (Irina), as a volunteer because of personal (religious) 
convictions and interests (Evgenia, a medical student, who works in a church-based NGO).  They 
                                                 
19
 I have not been able to locate actual numbers of HIV+ staff members across the HIV/AIDS NGO sector, but 
at least three interviewees indicated that their organizations started as self-help groups for and by HIV+ 
individuals.  In addition, a look at 31 online profiles of regional People Living With HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) 
Network representatives across Ukraine, revealed that out of 22 individuals who provided statements, 
approximately 8 mentioned issues like “…when I found out about my HIV+ status…,” “…help for people like 
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stayed because they found the work interesting and fulfilling and when funding became available, it 
became possible to devote more time to the NGO.   
Pay for NGO work, however, was not lavish for many staff members.  For example, Isaac 
said that he made about $300 per month as the director of his organization.20  He and Efim also 
commented on the strain of the work, citing a “temporary burnout effect” that they encountered 
several times per year, when they felt like abandoning everything and changing jobs.  Vera also 
described considerable strain and low pay among lower positioned workers: 21 
 
Vera: Well, we had a girl who left [the NGO]; her mother was [HIV] positive, so she 
began working with us. Now she attends [college] and works in a store…It was just 
very difficult for her.  I mean, the work is difficult – she worked in non-medical care 
– this means that clients die, it is psychologically very difficult work.  And I know 
that in other countries this is very highly paid work.  But in our country it’s…well, 
the maximum pay for a social worker is 750 hryvnas, that’s 150 dollars [per month], 
and that’s in [the capital] Kiev.   
  
 
Hemment (2007, p. 120), similarly, mentioned in her account of the Tver’ crisis center that social 
worker salaries were very low.  Grigory (a social worker) also stated that “you can’t make big money 
as a social worker.”  This account consequently contrasts the view that foreign-funded organizations 
were well-compensated, in particular, because of pay discrepancies within NGOs.   
Furthermore, I did not interpret social status, satisfaction from obtaining grants, creative work 
and self-realization, which came up in most interviews, necessarily as liabilities for NGO 
effectiveness (i.e. striving for local impact).  These may be self-serving objectives in some cases.  But 
my research suggests that such factors, in fact, made work more satisfying and meaningful for NGO 
                                                                                                                                                       
me…,” “…I live to work and work to live…,” etc. which I understood as indicative of their HIV+ status. At 
least three other PLWHA representatives mentioned that their friends or relatives were HIV+.   
 
20
 In early 2007, the approximate average monthly salaries were as follows (by age):  
18-28 years: $120; 29-49 years: $200; 60+ years: $100.  (N = 2118, across 132 locations)  
Source: http://www.vecherniy.kharkov.ua/news/9624/   
 
21
 Vera described her own workday as follows: “at nine in the morning I leave [home] and at nine at night I 
return.  And I have no strength left for my family (laughs), nor for sex, nor for my [teen daughter].  I just bark 
[at them]: ‘why are the dishes not washed,’ or ‘why is something else not done?’  Well.  Of course… (pause)  
It’s like that.” 
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employees, and thus buttressed their commitment to alleviating what they perceived as significant 
problems.  Additionally, one of the best indicators of commitment was staff members’ engagement in 
unpaid voluntary work. 
 
Improvisation and Voluntary Work   
 
Improvisation and voluntary work - phenomena that have received sparse attention in the 
literature (Hilhorst 2003) - came out prominently in my research.  Similarly to Oktiabrina’s outreach 
efforts, based out of the Tver’ women’s crisis center (Hemment 2007), Grigory, Isaac and Efim 
indicated that they, and other staff members, engaged in or contributed to unpaid voluntary activities.  
These activities involved upper management and lower staff members, but were initiated at various 
levels, for example by social workers, thereby to some extent circumventing hierarchical top-down 
management structures.   
The voluntary activities were part of how ideologically-driven activists attempted to make 
their work more meaningful, thus seeking out and creating opportunities for action.  Hilhorst (2003, p. 
9-10) maintained that “[i]t is by reshuffling and combining the different ‘pulls’ and ‘pushes’, in other 
words, by improvising, that NGO actors attribute meaning to the organization and arrive at a certain 
coherence in their everyday practices (Hilhorst 2003, p. 218).”  Hemment (2007, p. 126), for 
example, argued that at times Tver’ crisis center members - just like staff at other such centers - used 
the organization to discuss and plan “ingenious solutions” for self-education, material problems, and 
socializing, rather than domestic violence.  The women adopted the crisis center model, because it 
was viable with the donors at the time.  Simultaneously, however, they wanted to make sure that it 
would allow them to facilitate their own ideas and hoped that through contact with clients they could 
assess the need for counseling versus material needs (Hemment 2007, p. 106).  Oktiabrina, one of the 
center founders, and her coworkers, moreover, engaged in awareness-raising talks on domestic and 
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sexual violence, when the temporary absence of a phone line prevented the center from running a 
crisis hotline (Hemment 2007, p. 120).     
 Voluntary work, in HIV/AIDS NGOs, occurred outside funded projects, when some staff 
members thought that they were not able to engage in certain activities that they considered 
important.  Grigory, for example, stated that he was “very concerned with [with preventative 
measures in educational establishments],” 22 but “no matter how much I looked…for donors, 
organizations, that could give some sum of money for leading these…activities in our 
city…unfortunately there is nothing.”  Not everyone within his organization wanted to work 
voluntarily, because informational meetings in schools “take up a lot of time, there is a lot of 
resources [needed] and basically, this…is done on a voluntary [unpaid] basis… only through our 
initiative.”  “In essence,” he added, “we do not shy away from this, we always gladly do it.  It would 
just be preferable for us to do this...on a greater scale.”   
Grigory’s management, although supportive of the idea, was initially hesitant to release staff 
for this work, which sometimes took hours or days away from workers’ functional duties.  They 
eventually agreed, once the issues were negotiated and planned out.  Grigory proposed to collaborate 
with a center that had government funding for centralized preventative work among youth, because he 
and his colleagues had “newer technology and more…interesting information and…also training 
programs, like small workshops, for youth...interactive [workshops].” The center rejected 
collaboration, however, so Grigory and his colleagues continued this work on their own, but “on a 
smaller scale.”  One government agency, nonetheless, asked Grigory and some of his colleagues, as 
HIV/AIDS specialists, to conduct some of their preventative work; so they designed an official plan 
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 In 2002, (Saenko et. al. 2004, p. 30) interviewed 50 HIV/AIDS experts – law enforcement workers, doctors, 
city and local administrators, NGO activists, social workers, social educators -  in three regional Ukrainian 
centers, Dnepropetrovsk (central), Donetsk (eastern) and Kherson (southern).  59% stated that HIV/AIDS 
informational talks in schools, community, technical colleges and universities occurred regularly, 33% said that 
they occurred from time to time, 8% stated that they did not occur (Saenko et. al. 2004, p. 64).  31% of the 
experts also said that at the city level preventative work with youth was mostly or completely sufficient, 25% 
found it difficult to evaluate, while 44% said that it was mostly/completely insufficient (Saenko et. al. 2004, p. 
66).   
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with the agency.23  Grigory complained, however, that “again…[the agency staff] receive a salary for 
this, right?  We do not receive anything…for this work for our own [people (‘dlya svoih’)].”   
  Similar initiatives took place in Efim and Isaac’s NGOs.  Isaac wrote “[t]his is truly 
voluntary work, because it is not written into the project descriptions,” and Efim confirmed that 
donors did not take it into consideration (“ne uchityvaetsya”).  Isaac, moreover, was directly involved 
in planning these activities and even emailed me a list of objectives that he developed for a three-
session workshop.  His staff scheduled and arranged activities with local educational establishments 
and he had no problem releasing them for these purposes.  Like Grigory, Efim added that staff 
members were released when they were invited to schools as HIV/AIDS specialists (mostly by 
government agencies that deal with youth and families).   
  Isaac and Efim revealed another interesting effort to implement ideas that they considered 
important.  At one point I asked them whether they knew of open-ended funding competitions, which 
I had read were generally rare (Sundstrom 2006, p. 38-40).  Both had applied for and did not receive 
such grants in the past, which, indeed, they considered rare and did not know anyone who had 
obtained such grants.  Isaac wrote a proposal to support a voluntary association of youth 
organizations created under the regional governor’s office.  He explained that “[s]tudents gather after 
class and analyze Ukrainian legislation that pertains to youth…which laws are being upheld, which 
are not.  They make their recommendations to the governor, so that he can take action accordingly.”  
Isaac’s NGO was part of this association, because “HIV/AIDS is a problem that mostly affects 
youth.”  He stated that he wanted to support the group, and create leaders who would be more 
educated on issues and would take them to upper-level authorities, but the problem was that “sooner 
or later initiative can disappear,” because “it is a lot of work… let’s say, they work for a year and 
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 63% of experts rated cooperation between government agencies and non-governmental organizations, on 
HIV/AIDS informational/educational initiatives with children and youth, as sufficient in the cities (Saenko et. 
al. 2004, p. 72).    
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there are no results, nothing.  Just initiative.  Then problems begin.  This is all youth…students.  They 
finish their university, go to work, and they have absolutely no time for the social sphere anymore.”   
Efim and his colleagues, meanwhile, wrote a proposal for assistance to street children, which 
they considered important because they were not aware of any such projects in the city or 
regionally.24  Efim stated that “[t]here were no [donor-specified] grant competitions [for street 
children].  I mean, some say that there were competitions for that, but…we have not seen them.”  
Although it is unclear why these projects were not funded, we can see how both men assessed the 
local situation and substantiated their claims.  Isaac’s proposal, in particular, was a textbook example 
of what most social scientists would argue strengthens civil society - a project to build up a cadre of 
critically engaged youth who analyze the nation’s legislation. His proposal, in fact, was not even 
directly for his organizations’ project activities!  Both men, who are in upper management positions, 
attempted to make the best of their structural constraints to fund initiates that they perceived as 
locally significant.             
 Not every staff member, however, was as committed as the people I interviewed.  Hilhorst 
(2003, p. 159-60), for example, described a three-way staff division within a Philippine NGO that she 
researched.  The first division consisted of highly involved and committed upper management, who 
were former movement activists.  The second division consisted of ideologically committed newer 
staff.  The third division, however, consisted of staff hired for various project purposes and had little 
or no affiliation with the political movement.  They had little loyalty and could easily move on to 
other job opportunities.  It is logical that internal stratification existed across a variety of NGOs.  
Vera, for instance, stated that some people in her NGO only complete their assigned tasks and “do not 
think at all how to develop this [project] direction, or how to strengthen it, or what to do so that it 
becomes stable, regardless of whether there will be donor funds.”  She can hold them responsible for 
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 84% of experts rated preventative work with street children in the cities mostly or completely insufficient 
(Saenko et. al. 2004, p. 66).   
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their work quality, as long as long as she provides them with a stable salary.  “But such people,” she 
added, “do not need anything, except to carry out this work and to receive their stable salary.” 
 Discussions of internal divisions are largely lacking from prevalent NGO accounts, which do 
not show us internal variation that constitutes these organizations.  Moreover, Vera’s comments 
suggest that perhaps top-down management operates primarily on workers who do not take initiative 
(although, alternatively, some of them possibly forego initiative because of top-down management).  
Meanwhile, others, like Grigory, influence NGO direction and activities despite the organizational 
hierarchy, in fact, circumventing it by initiating activities and then engaging upper management in the 
planning.     
To sum up, we should consider NGOs’ internal stratification, because these divisions help to 
conceptualize and unpack various organizational activities.  In fact, through this lens we can see that 
prevalent NGO critiques in the literature do not apply evenly across workers and possibly NGOs.  It 
is important to note that commitment varies among NGO staff and my focus here is primarily on a 
cadre of some of the committed activists.  They are distinct in their motivation and efforts to 
implement ideas that they consider locally relevant.25  Committed activists, moreover, may hold 
positions across the organizational hierarchy.  To the extent that activists in lower positions initiate 
(voluntary) projects and engage upper-level staff, they mitigate top-down NGO structure.  Some 
upper-level workers, however, also strive to support local initiatives, but within their own sphere of 
activity, namely assisting with administrative and planning tasks (as opposed to direct outreach), as 
well as attempting to find and secure funding for important causes (which may not even be directly 
tied to their NGOs’ activities).  It is also noteworthy that voluntary activities occurred in collaboration 
with state agencies, either initiated by activists, or the agencies, and, as Grigory noted, were intended 
to broaden the scale of the outreach efforts.   
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 Although some discrepancies between clients and NGO workers exist.  For example, Grigory mentioned that 
he considered some clients’ requests for money, in lieu of food assistance packages, “mercantilistic.”   
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Evaluating Neoliberal Individualism, NGOs and Social Welfare 
 
Despite these somewhat optimistic findings, juxtaposing the larger neoliberal logic of the 
post-Soviet reforms and the NGO project, with the activists’ understanding of their work in general 
and their often admirable personal efforts specifically, revealed a potentially troubling issue.  Faced 
with considerable strain, uncertainty, and new individualistic values, NGO activists, perhaps 
implicitly, sought to take refuge in the idea of personal efficacy and responsibility, thereby potentially 
sustaining a decentralized social service model.  In an interesting parallel, Rivkin-Fish (2005) argued 
that in the reformed Russian healthcare system “personal and privatizing strategies repeatedly 
produced less than actors hoped: doctors’ efforts to resist the ‘collective irresponsibility’ structured 
into the health care system through individual, heroic efforts of taking ‘personal responsibility’ for 
their work were unable to overcome the range of obstacles stemming from poverty, political 
disenfranchisement and the fragmented nature of the system itself (p. 212-213).” 
HIV/AIDS activists’ demands and responsibilities for ameliorating local conditions resided 
primarily with themselves, despite some notable efforts to “externalize” solutions and broaden 
outreach.  Thus, Grigory and his colleagues, as well as activists at other NGOs, sought out and 
engaged in voluntary work with state agencies that agreed to collaborate with them (and sometimes 
even extended invitations).  While the intention to extend outreach efforts was admirable, it is 
important to emphasize that these meetings occurred only due to the tenacity and individual labor of 
committed activists.26  Similarly, Isaac and Efim sought funding and provided administrative support, 
for what they considered important local issues, on a case by case basis and through rarely available 
(and attainable) flexible funding.  These efforts largely emphasized individual activists’ responsibility 
for expanding outreach and extending services, rather than expanding the social safety net constricted 
via neoliberal reforms.   
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The uncertainty of the post-Soviet transition, moreover, was manifest in the activists’ 
equivocal perceptions of donors, the state and their own roles.  Interviewees simultaneously criticized 
and sought collaboration with and support from the state, foreign donors (and other local actors, like 
businesses, the public, etc). They praised donors for providing funding and information.  On the other 
hand, they explicitly lamented the instability and insufficiency of funding and implicitly its 
competitiveness.  Similarly, they listed a litany of grievances against the state – ranging from 
unwieldy bureaucracy, to prejudice against NGOs and HIV/AIDS, to corruption, and other problems - 
yet, they voluntarily collaborated with state agencies and extended hopes for state support.  Moreover, 
they hoped for some future stability, juxtaposing state funding with “third sector” (nonprofit/civil 
society) and the new NGO-based “social entrepreneurship”27 models introduced by donors.  They 
intuitively perceived their precarious environment, but could not acknowledge the larger social trends 
accountable for their difficulties.  The following (rearranged) excerpts from Efim and Isaac’s 
interview are exemplary of some of the activists’ ambiguity: 
Efim [explaining the dependence on foreign funding]: That’s the horror of it all.  
Why are we here [on a donor-sponsored trip in the U.S.]?  I mean, the terrible thing 
in our country is that the government, aside from making speeches, does not help us 
with anything.  And what they tell us, that they are doing something, is all fairy tales.  
Well, corruption?  Yes, I’ll admit it, there is corruption everywhere… [On the other 
hand] if the government does not offer support – then it will be an…enemy (laughs).  
Yes, an enemy.  And what will happen?  Well, the third sector, if it survives, will be 
strong…[But] if we have self-service without government [help], then what will 
happen in the future?… all these donors [lists several] are planning on leaving 
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 Underscoring the idea of decentralization inherent among NGOs, Saenko et. al. (2004, p. 8) argued that 
inadequate coordination among various international donors’ projects, leads to duplicate HIV/AIDS studies 
with similar focus and methodology, rather than investigation of new topics.   
 
27
 Phillips (2005) argued that in Ukraine, the “logics of the social enterprise and similar programs reinforce [the] 
burden [of social responsibilities formerly managed by the state] through their implicit dismissal of citizens' 
claims on state assistance and support, and the stress they place on ‘self-sufficiency’ and ‘independence from 
donors.’"  Additionally, the burden of the “caring work,” could fall disproportionately on women, already 
relegated to “caring work” within their families.  Some social enterprises, when headed by dedicated social 
activists, were successful at generating necessary operational capital, feeding the hungry and employing people 
with disabilities.  The prospects for many enterprises, nonetheless, looked limited.  NGO activists who adopted 
the social enterprise model sometimes did this out of necessity, when other funding options were foreclosed or 
severely limited.  But the ventures were fraught with difficulties and contradictions, ranging from ethical and 
practical concerns that needy members would have to work to keep the NGO afloat, to cumbersome, mercurial 
business laws, public skepticism about businesses and NGOs, corruption, and the viability of business success.   
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[Ukraine]… And now everyone understands that and everyone works with the state, 
somehow trying to do something there (laughs)… 
Isaac: Solution to the current situation?  Well, I have thought about this a lot 
and…well, two solutions: of course, financing from the government…at least.  And 
secondly…creation of a social enterprise [an idea Evgenia also championed].  Right 
now…my central office is working on this; [they] already started to implement it.  So 
that…there would be a business which would produce revenue and it would support 
[NGO] programs… 
Efim: Yes…So we have only two solutions.  
Isaac: Only two (laughs).  And both from the realm of the impossible.    
Efim:  Everyone begins with [foreign] donors…Some options exist…to receive start-
up grants for social enterprises.  Small ones… Ten thousand…dollars…They give 
them for…some small  
laundromats, small (work)shops… 
Isaac: Well, that’s just laughable.  That’s not an amount with which you can start 
something.    
Efim: Well, at least [something]…So, two solutions…   
 
 
These exchanges indicate that commitment-driven activists, who were unable to overcome 
the elusive gaps in the social system, constantly felt personally responsible to both capture and create 
opportunities from numerous sources, thus trying to make sense of, systematize, and channel social 
resources that had become particularly unsystematic in the post-Soviet period.  Thus, Vera maintained 
a constant self-critique to do more, work harder, and push the limits to sustain and create projects, 
which brought her great satisfaction when she succeeded and disappointment when she did not or 
could not.28  It is also telling that Isaac and Efim perceived both social enterprise and government 
funding within the frame of the contracting paradigm – such that business-generated, or government 
money should replace foreign funding for non-governmental organizations.  In the process, they 
affirmed notions of liberal individualism underlying the broad neoliberal reforms.  Thus, Western 
funding, combined with other social transformations, may have socialized some of the committed 
activists in Ukraine into an individualistic paradigm and created (the beginnings of?) what Bartley 
(2007) called an institutional field, or an organizational environment with new norms and legitimacy 
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 We should not dismiss, however, some of the positive developments of NGO advocacy.  Vera stated that 
“[o]ver two years we developed a methodological manual, in partnership with the regional institute for teacher 
development…called ‘Interactive technologies for HIV prevention and formation of tolerant attitudes toward 
HIV positive people.’  It was issued a certificate of authorship and now we are going to move it to the 
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claims.  These new norms outline what Neuman (2005) dubbed the shadow (private) welfare state in 
the U.S., which includes shifting “the basis for claiming benefits from being a universal and public 
citizenship right to being a private, contingent patron-client reward” and reducing “pressure to expand 
and improve public benefit levels by offering private sector alternatives (p. 538).”  Thus, fewer 
resources are devoted to human needs and services, while the trend is toward negotiating 
subcontracting and division of labor with the private (and non-governmental) sector (Shaw 2000, p. 
3).  These findings are thus potentially at odds with Western promises of a more prosperous, 
egalitarian society.    
On the other hand, what is a viable alternative?  As Kuzio (2003) had argued above, the state 
should not be reduced, but reorganized to better suit its citizens.  In light of this comparison, I 
critically evaluate two claims that Westerners had made in favor of NGOs, as opposed to the state: 
NGOs’ relative credibility (lack of corruption) and limited bureaucracy (efficiency).  First, despite the 
prevalence of significant state corruption, which I have noted above (also see Shelley 2005, p. 15, 
Hemment 2007), corruption among NGOs (Reimann 2005, p. 42-43, Gibelman and Gelman 2004) is 
also a potential problem that has received little scholarly, or donor attention (who, of course, would 
be reluctant to publicize it).  In my research, several interviewees indicated the existence of this 
problem.  Evgenia, for example, explained that “it is not a secret that…many…[non-governmental] 
organizations are created – well, it’s like that everywhere – they are created for the purpose of money 
laundering…” 
Secondly, lack of NGO bureaucracy may be somewhat of a misnomer, which neglects the 
local complexity of running these organizations.  Uvin (2000, p. 24) proposed that even when NGOs 
are not directly involved in active politics or want to change state behavior, they are nonetheless 
engaged with the state and political processes.  In part, this is due to the registration, taxation and 
legal requirements, as well as public funding issues, joint projects and personal connections with state 
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think that it is unique; before, there was no such methodological manual in Ukraine.”    
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officials.  My research supports Uvin’s proposal.  An NGO does not simply receive a grant and begin 
providing services and advocating on behalf of its constituencies.  Establishing and maintaining a 
funded organization, in addition to Uvin’s claims, also involves dealing with the sponsors’ 
bureaucracy and oversight, including frequent audits, reports and other guidelines.  Moreover, NGOs 
have infrastructural needs and must deal with authorities at different levels, in order to obtain office 
space, water, heat, electricity, phone and internet lines (not always easy in the post-Soviet 
environment).  Some organizations, which are located in networks, or are part of federated structures, 
have to coordinate activities with other NGOs, and comply with regulations of and obligations to their 
central offices or governing boards (Hemment 2006, Henderson 2003, my interviews).  If we think of 
some of the difficulties NGOs face, when working with various actors, as decentralized bureaucratic 
hurdles – i.e. NGOs dealing with a kind of “diffuse bureaucracy” outside these organizations, which 
nonetheless “resides” between NGOs’ goals and the ability to carry them out – then we can begin to 
think of these problems in comparison with the centralized bureaucracy of the state.  The nature of 
these piecemeal NGO interactions, however, as opposed to the more visible state bureaucracy, 
potentially obscures a succinct comparative focus between the two.  It would be interesting to see 
whether this observation may apply more broadly to Western non-profits and contract-based services.  
Preliminary findings consequently suggest that donor claims about NGO credibility and lack of 
bureaucracy likely warrant further research and perhaps questions about donors’ sustained support for 
NGO initiatives, instead of greater assistance to building state capacity.  If my assertions here are 
correct, then ideological commitment to liberal notions of civil society, the relatively low cost of 
supporting NGOs, and ability to influence them more than states, which I mentioned earlier, may play 
the main role in donors’ motives to fund these organizations.
      
 
 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION AND BRIEF IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM 
 
My aim has been to show how NGO activists, embedded in a reforming nation and complex 
relationships with local constituencies, foreign donors and the state, seek to make sense of their work, 
drawing on multiple discourses.  I also sought to outline what their understanding may imply for the 
broader social context.  Specifically, I have argued that Ukrainian, post-Soviet, NGOs were supported 
by Western sponsors at the same time as broad neoliberal social reforms considerably shifted many 
social responsibilities to non-state actors and reduced the social safety net.  HIV/AIDS NGOs began 
to respond to these changes by providing services to and advocating on behalf of thousands of people 
affected by the burgeoning HIV/AIDS epidemic.     
In order to examine how activists made sense of their daily work, I unpacked internal NGO 
dynamics and found variation among workers based on ideological commitment and engagement in 
voluntary work.  Internal variation also revealed that when considering only some of the most 
committed activists, many of the prevalent NGO critiques in the literature seemed less appropriate.  
Despite this finding, placing activists’ sense-making processes in a broader social context indicated 
that activists committed to helping the local population, yet facing great uncertainty within the post-
Soviet transitional environment, sought a sense of security and efficacy in the emerging norms of 
personal responsibility and individualism, inherent both in the broader social reforms, as well as 
liberal civil society models and funding structures that Western donors advocated.  In doing so, NGO 
activists potentially reinforced the decentralized social safety net.  Finally, I proposed that some of the 
Western arguments for sponsoring NGOs, rather than developing state capacity, deserve further 
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investigation.  When considered critically, NGOs may exhibit some of the corruption and 
bureaucratic problems that were cited as shortcomings of the state. 
This research potentially speaks to different literatures.  In closing, I want to briefly explore 
potential implications for the emerging study of transnational activism.  In recent scholarship, Keck 
and Sikkink (1998), Jackie Smith (2000) and Tilly and Tarrow (2007, p. 172-174) have all 
highlighted the increasing global ties between activists.  They underscored the importance of new 
global institutions and transnational non-governmental organizations in maintaining ties that span 
from local NGOs to global polity forums and foreign governments.  In particular, the authors focused 
on the advocacy aspects of global activism.  Smith (2000, p. 65), for instance, substantiated this focus 
by stating that NGOs, which have been traditionally service-oriented, since the 1960’s began 
increasingly moving into advocacy.  While this may be true, it is also likely, as Uvin (2000, p. 25-6) 
had argued, and my research indicated, that many NGOs are involved in numerous activities 
simultaneously, including advocacy and lobbying, as well as providing services and engaging in 
direct community action.29   
To the extent that services and advocacy are combined in some organizations, I suggest that 
we should consider them together.  Examining how NGOs balance service and advocacy functions 
within their environments is important not only because of the ideas that NGOs explicitly propagate 
(which may be quite progressive) - and thus we should be cognizant of the content of their claims - 
but also because service and advocacy functions influence their “modes of activism.”  Depending on 
the context, they may contribute to social organization models that are simultaneously "pro-people" 
and "pro-market."  In a sense, as I suggested earlier, local NGOs with transnational ties, which 
provide services, are, in fact, part of the local social safety net.  When they also engage in advocacy, 
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 Smith (2000, p. 73) indicated that TSMOs (transnational social movement organizations) tend to over-
represent activists from Western Europe and North America.  They also tend to be smaller and command 
budgets that do not compare to those of development organizations with funds from government aid agencies.  
Smith (2000, p. 74-5) argued that these organizations tend to be relatively democratic and representative and 
break down social inequalities.  While this may be true, my extension of the argument to NGOs that combine 
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however, they may be inadvertently pitting the two objectives at odds with each other.  Organizations 
embedded in a decentralizing, privatizing, state, which are advocating for expansion of services, may 
be defusing the urgency of state response when they simultaneously provide the services for which 
they lobby; or they could be effectively advocating for some rights, while their service model 
undermines others.  Committed activists may feel compelled to offer direct aid through their NGOs 
(“at least something”) in light of dire circumstances, but may miss how they help propagate the 
broader social system that curtails services.  Undoubtedly, there may be instances when NGOs are 
best-suited to help, perhaps to quickly mobilize their personnel and provide urgent aid.  In other 
contexts, however, maybe when services are necessary for a large population over many years, we 
should question the practicality and stability of roles NGOs play.  On the other hand, some types of 
advocacy may work well, depending on the environment.
                                                                                                                                                       
advocacy and service functions adds potentially relevant, yet complicating factors, including post-Soviet 
environment idiosyncrasies and interplay between advocacy and service.    
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APPENDIX 
Selected Survey and Interview Responses from HIV/AIDS NGO Staff about their Backgrounds, 
Clientele and Workplaces (N=6) 
 
Survey #
Interview 
Only
1 2 3 4 5 Mean Median Mode Sum
Notes Q. # Item
from donor 
description 
(supplied by 
staff) NGO position
Head of 
Coordinatio
n Board of 
NGOs
Administrator of 
Educational 
Programs
Program 
Coordinator
Head of 
Organization
Social 
Worker
Program 
Coordinator
my 
determination
sex: (1 = 
female; 2 = 
male) 1 1 2 2 2 1.6 2 2
2 Name Irina Evgenia Efim Isaac Grigory Vera
4 Age (years) 27 21
late 20s-early 
30s 29 32
mid 30s-early 
40s
about 
29.5 about 29.5
5 Education higher
higher in 
progress
night school in 
progress higher
incomplete 
higher higher higher
6
Place of 
education
State 
University
Medical 
University
State 
Universities
State 
Institute
State 
University
7
Current 
workplace
a
Only in one 
NGO that 
focuses on 
HIV/AIDS 
issues. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
b
Number of 
years working 
in NGO 2 2 5 4 2.5 about 6-7
about 
3.7 about 3.1 2
c
Work in other 
place(s) 
(number) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8
Number of 
people 
working in 
NGO
a total 12 7 25 15 14 14.6 14 73
b men 5 3 12 3 8 6.2 5 3 31
c women 7 4 13 12 6 8.4 7 42
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Selected Survey and Interview Responses from HIV/AIDS NGO Staff about their Backgrounds, 
Clientele and Workplaces (N=6)  
(continued) 
 
Survey #
Interview 
Only
1 2 3 4 5 Mean Median Mode Sum
Notes Q. # Item
9
Age of NGO 
coworkers (1-
8: greatest to 
smallest 
category)
I changed 0 (no 
one) to 8 
(smallest 
category) a under 18 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
b 18-25 1 2 3 1 2 1.8 2 1
c 26-35 2 1 1 2 1 1.4 1 1
d 36-45 8 3 2 3 3 3.8 3 3
e 46-55 8 8 4 8 8 7.2 8 8
f 56-65 8 8 8 4 8 7.2 8 8
g over 65 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
I changed 0 (no 
one) to 10 
(smallest 
category) 10
Age of Clients 
(1-10: 
greatest-
smallest 
category)
a 0-5 10 10 3 2 4 5.8 4 10
b 6 10 10 7 7 4 5 6.6 7 7
c 11 17 2 6 6 10 5 5.8 6 6
d 18-25 1 2 5 3 3 2.8 3 3
e 26-35 3 1 2 1 1 1.6 1 4
f 36-45 4 3 1 5 2 3 3
g 46-55 5 4 4 10 6 5.8 5 4
h 56-65 6 5 7 10 7 7 7 7
i over 65 7 10 10 10 10 9.4 10 10
11
Percent men 
& women 
among NGO 
clients (target 
audience)
a % women 55 50 55 70 60 58 55 55
b % men 45 50 45 30 40 42 45 45
23
Percent of the 
budget from 
sponsors
a 0-25% 0
b 26-50% 0
c 51-75% 1 1
d 76-100% 1 1 1 1 4
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